Camp Mystic operators made the right decision to withdraw their application for a license to operate this summer.

Camp Mystic operators made the right decision to withdraw their application for a license to operate this summer.

Photo illustration by Michael Hogue

Over the last week, Texans had to relive one of the worst tragedies our state has ever experienced. 

The reason was a legislative hearing around the decisions and events that led to the deaths of 25 young girls and two teenage counselors during a flash flood that rampaged through the historic, all-girls Camp Mystic in Kerr County.  

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The more you know about happened, the harder it is to understand. That we reached a point in late April, during these hearings, when the camp’s ownership was still pushing to re-open this summer is, in itself, inconceivable.  

We know now, through long investigation, that Camp Mystic’s staff had more than enough time to move all the campers to safer locations that were, at most, a few hundred yards away. Instead, most of the adults hesitated, unsure of what was happening and what they should do.  

There was no proper preparation for the likelihood of a catastrophic flood. There was no clear plan for what to do if one raged down a river known for sudden and disastrous swells.  

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Early that July morning, water began invading the cabins closest to the river, covering roads and low bridges and cutting off safe evacuation routes. Lives that could have been saved were lost. 

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The state has a duty to ensure this does not happen again. And it has a duty to ensure that, after such an unimaginable failure, this particular camp does not re-open and carry on as if the past were just the past.  

Thankfully, Camp Mystic’s owners withdrew their license application, sparing still-grieving families and the state what might have become a legal or legislative struggle. 

The effort to re-open has even been a dividing line in some wealthy neighborhoods around Texas, where generations of families have sent girls to spend summers along the banks of the Guadalupe River. 

Many families have been eager to move on and re-engage in the traditions they remember, even as other families in those same communities endure the devastation of having lost their girls. 

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We side with the families that believe the camp should not have even considered re-opening this summer. Whether it should ever open again under its current ownership is a question worth considering.  

As late as last week, on Camp Mystic’s website, there is scant mention of the tragedy. To browse its pages is surreal. It’s as if those 27 girls didn’t die because of the fundamental mismanagement that took place. 

Under a “resources” tab, a viewer could find a half-hour video insisting that the camp’s cabins were “out of the floodplain.” In the video, Richard Eastland, a son of former camp director Dick Eastland, who died in the flood, blames media sensationalism for driving the narrative around what happened at Camp Mystic. 

But, prior to the flood, the camp successfully appealed federal maps that showed the cabins were in a “Special Flood Hazard Area,” according to news reports. And then, when the flood came, camp leaders had no plan and seasonal staff had no training for how to deal with it.  

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There are also carefully edited videos, one of which explains that this is a “villainless story.”  

It’s true that no one intended for what happened at Mystic to happen. But the evidence of negligence that has emerged means there must be consequences. And among those is the certainty that Mystic should not have considered re-opening this summer.   

The tragedy at Camp Mystic was part of a much larger disaster in the Texas Hill Country, an historic but relatively predictable flash flood that killed more than 135 adults and children. The devastation revealed weaknesses in flood plain management, emergency preparedness, disaster warning systems, communications and of course, camp safety.  

The deaths at Camp Mystic were particularly excruciating because the victims were so young — for some, it was their first time attending summer camp — and the adults charged with protecting them failed them so completely.  

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Legislators used a special session last year to review and tighten regulations governing campgrounds and youth camps and other disaster-related topics. Youth camps now must submit much more detailed emergency plans to the state. The joint Texas House-Senate investigative committee, which held hearings last week about the Camp Mystic disaster, showed why tighter regulations are critical if the state’s youth camps want to continue operating.  

Lawmakers hired independent investigators Casey Garrett, an attorney, and Michael Massengale, a former appellate court justice, to help them better understand the events at Camp Mystic.  

The investigative team interviewed dozens of witnesses and collected and analyzed cell phone data, archived weather alerts, photos and videos taken by staff, recorded 911 calls, text messages, transcripts from previous hearings and legal proceedings and physical evidence. Their presentation to the committee provided the most detailed public account so far of what happened at Camp Mystic during the early morning hours of July 4, 2025.  

Garrett described how the camp’s culture concentrated authority in Dick Eastland’s hands. Generations of girls, many from some of Texas’ most prominent families, had attended camp there, and those close ties and positive experiences may have encouraged parents to reflexively trust that camp operators were prepared for anything.  

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Camp Mystic’s setting and traditions were so enriching it was easy for families not to notice what the camp lacked. The camp conducted no emergency drills. Investigators found no evidence counselors had training for emergencies. Adult staff did not have assigned duties in disasters. There was virtually no planning for emergency communications, no identified muster site. There was no delegation of authority if Dick Eastland was unavailable.  

“Not a single person said they were ever instructed sufficiently on what to do in any kind of emergency,” Garrett, the investigator, told committee members. 

The written emergency plan for floods said girls must stay in their cabins, and they would receive instructions through the camp loudspeakers. Although the public address system was apparently working the night of the flash flood, no announcement was made. Some girls were swept out of their cabins as they waited for a rescue that never came.  

Eastland may have had an emergency plan in mind, Massengale told the committee, but “it didn’t empower anybody else at that camp to participate and help in the evacuation of the campers.” 

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Sen. Charles Perry, R-Lubbock, said repeatedly during the hearings that he would do everything in his power to prevent Camp Mystic from re-opening under the current operators. But Perry and other lawmakers, as well as the investigators, stressed that they do not believe Camp Mystic’s shortcomings are unique among youth camps.  

“The fate of those girls was set before any first drop of rain ever fell,” Perry said. “Mystic just happened to be the unlucky one. Because I think every camp, every camp, has fallen into this human nature of complacency.” 

The testimony was often painful to listen to, but parents and camp operators can learn from the hearings. 

It is a mistake to concentrate authority in one person, even when that person is beloved by staff and many campers. Camp leadership should encourage seasonal and permanent staff to ask questions about procedures and understand and drill their specific duties before an emergency occurs. 

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Camp Mystic’s operators didn’t take the risk of floods as seriously as they should have — even though the camp had experienced less devastating floods in the past and the entire region is known as “Flash Flood Alley.” Camp operators must move away from riverside cabins, even if they have seemed safe for years. 

“Every couple of decades, are we prepared to sacrifice campers on the altar of having cabins on the waterfront instead of up on the bluff?” Garrett asked 

Youth camps must train their counselors to handle more than homesickness and lifeguard duties. But at the same time, Garrett noted teenagers and young adults spend their summers differently now, taking summer classes and working in pre-professional internships, which is probably making it harder for camp directors to find young people to work as camp counselors.  

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The state’s new youth camp standards are rigorous and may need revision in the next Legislature. As of last week, only three out of the state’s approximately 300 youth camps have met all the requirements and been granted licenses to operate this summer. 

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But the new rules were born out of tragedy and target the kind of complacency and under-preparation that led to the death of 27 young girls and teenagers. As difficult as they may be to implement, they will save lives. And all responsible camp operators should want to do everything in their power to meet that goal. 

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